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[So F. No. 19975. In Bank. Nov. 10, 1959.]

CAROLYN "R. GARDNER et al., Respondents, v. STATE
OF CALIFORNIA DIRECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT
et al., Appellants.
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Right to Benefits-Trade Disputes.

o

-The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board properly denied unemployment insurance benefits to union employees of
certain restaurants, members of a county restaurant association, under Unempl. Ins. Code, § 1262, rendering ineligible for
unemployment benefits a workman who "left his work because
of a trade dispute," where, following negotiations on modification of a master contract covering all restaurant workers in
the area, the union representing them voted to strike against
the entire industry, two weeks later the restaurant association
voted to adhere to a previously adopted policy that a strike
against one member would be recognized as a strike against
all and so notified the union executive board, the executive
board of the union called a strike against nine or ten restaurant
members of the association, and the association on the same
day notified its members to layoff their employees on the following day because of the strike, thus causing the unemployment for which benefits were sought, since the claimants were
out of work after the lockout because of their own conduct
and that of their union.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. John D. Foley, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
•
[1] See Oal..Tur.2d, Unemployment Insurance, § 22.
:Melt. Dig. Reference: [1] Unemployment Insurance, § 20.
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County Restaurant Association or had given such association
authority to negotiate labor matters for them. There were
approximately 70 members of the association and 44 authorizing employers (hereinafter treated as members) in a total
of 700 to 800 establishments. Lists of the association members
had been sent to the board under dates of March 11, 1955, and
April 28, 1955. Association members employed about 50 per
cent (about 1,600 to 1,800 of the total of approximately 3,500)
of all the employes in the industry in the county, including
other help such as supervisorial, clerical, and: office employes.
Collective bargaining agreements had been negotiated by and
executed between the board and the association from 1951
through 1955, during which time the board had recognized the
association as the bargaining agent for association members
and the association had likewise recognized the board as bargaining agent for the employes of association members.
On April 11, 1955, following negotiations, on modification
of a 1953 master contract,' the unions voted to strike against
the entire industry, and the board was authorized to determine
when and against whom to call and implement the authoriR:ed
strike. This action by the unions marked the inception of a
trade dispute and was the forerunner of typical collective bargaining maneuvers, collective for all the member employes
through their Local Joint Executive Board and for all the
member employers through their county association. It was
the intent of the union in seeking to secure a more desirable
master contract to use the strategy of implementing the strike
against, and picketing, selected association members rather
than undertaking to walk out of, and picket, all at the same
time. Two weeks later (April 25) association members voted
to adhere to the previously adopted policy, that a strike implemented against one would be recogniR:ed as a strike directed
against all, and on April 28 notified the board of this decision.
The unions were of course aware that the trade dispute concerned the terms of their master contract, that they had voted
a strike against, and were seeking a better contract with, all
association members, and they were specifically notified that a
strike implemented by them against any association member
would, or at least could, result in a retaliatory shutdown or
~ oontraet had eovered the period from July 1, 1953, to April
80, 1956, and had provided that the anniversa.r;r date would be April 30
of each :rear and that, on the BeIlOnd anniversary date, it qht be
opened on the hlsuell of wqes and fringe benefits.
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lockout by other association members.4 It is clear that at
this time a trade dispute was in progress but until this time
no economic weapon had actually been applied by either party.
But on May 25, 1955, the first blow was struck; the board,
seeking to enforce its previously announced demands for
changes in the master contract affecting all employers and all
employes, called and implemented the authorized strike
against, and picketed, the establishments of nine or 10 association members. On the same day the association, pursuant to
its previously announced policy, retaliated by notifying its
members to layoff their employes as of the close of business
the following day, because of the strike. The evidence conflicts as to the effectiveness of the shutdown. There is testimony that the lockout was 70 per cent effective as to total
number of employes affected, and also that only some 34 or
35 members (with an unspecified number of establishments)
had effected complete lockouts. On June 13, 1955, the lockout was terminated by the association because it was not complete and had caused dissension among the members. Some
of the members allegedly signed individual contracts, but
negotiations between the board and association were continued
and on June 29, 1955, an agreement was executed by the executive board and by the association. Such master agreement
covered the association members who had allegedly signed
individual contracts as well as the others, and the dispute
between the unions and the association thereupon terminated.
[1] Petitioners were union member employes of restaurants
which closed in response to the association's notice. The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board determined that under
the volitional test rule as enunciated, developed and applied in
Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. Oalifornia Emp. Oom. (1941), 17 Cal.
2d 321, 327 [109 P.2d 935] ; Bunny's Waffle Shop v. Oalifornia
Emp. Oom. (1944), 24 Cal.2d 735, 738, 742 [151 P.2d 224] ;
McKinley V. Oalifornia. Emp. Stab. Oom. (1949), 34 Cal.2d
239,244-245 [209 P.2d 602] ; and Ohrysler Oorp. V. Oalifornia
Emp. Stab. Oom. (1953), 116 Cal.App.2d 8, 15-20 [3-7] [253
P.2d 68] (see also Barber V. Oalifornia. Emp. Stab. Oant.
(1954), 130 Cal.App.2d 7, 16-20 [278 P.2d 762]), petitioners
-Evidence on the following proposition was in considerable con1lict:
In 1953 despite a similar notice that a strike against one would be eon·
sidered a strike against all, the board had called a strike against some
association members, which proceeded for six weeks before the association had called for a lockout by nonstruck members_ The strike ended the
day after the lockout began; the dispute had been settled with a new
collective bargaining agreement. The number or percentage of nonstruck
mllIl1bers who had honored the lockout request was not established.
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had left their work because of a trade dispute and hence, under section 1262 of the Unemployment Insurance Code,! were
ineligible for benefits.
.
This determination is correct unless we; are to overrule
the McKinley case and overrule, disapprove or distinguish the
other cited cases. Here as in McKinley, the unions had voted
to strike against the entire industry and the executive board
was authorized (in the language of the appeals board's decision) "to call a strike if and when and .against whom it
determined to be to the best advantage of the union"; the
objective sought to be accomplished by the strike was the
making of certain changes in the master collective bargaining
agreement, which changes would affect all association members
and their employes; furthermore, as in McKinley, the unions
were aware of the policy of the employers, acting through
their association, that a called strike agamst one would be
considered a strike against all.~ Obviously here, as in McKinley, the unions could foresee that the strategy of implementing the strike against less than all members might result in termination of the employment of employes of the other
members, and that their consequent unemployment would,
under the currently established rule, be reg~rded as voluntary
and thus a bar to benefits. As in Thomas v. California Emp.
Stab. Com. (1952), 39 Cal.2d 501, 504-506 [5, 6] [247 P.2d
561], the only reasonable conclusion consistent with the volitional theory, as it is accepted and applied in this state, is that
the claimants were out of work after the lockout because of
their own conduct and that of their authorized unions.
Petitioners urge that we overrule the volitional test, at
least as applied in McKinley, or else undertake to distinguish
the present case in order to permit payment of benefits. We
recognize that the McKinley decision was by a divided court.
The majority (four of the justices) concurred in analyzing
the Bunny's Waffle Shop decision as follows (34 Ca1.2d 239,
243-244): "[C]ertain restaurant owners sought to compel
SSee footnote 1, supra, p. 24.
•According to the decision of tbe appeals board, "As a result of • • •
notice and discussion" bad with the association's members and commit·
tees, the union was aware that a lookout could result in ease of a strike;
but it did not believe that such result would follow. Tbe executive board
viewed the notiee of tbe assooiation as a threat which migbt be tried but
which would be ineffeetive. • • . In our opinion, the facts are such as to
render all of the claimants exeept [an employe of a restaurant not a
member of the assooia.tion] •.. ineligible for benefits within the rule
of McKi",Ull v. CalifCYmw Employment Stabilwation. Commission (1949),
84 Cal.2d 289 [209 P.2d 602)."
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their employees, through their union, to deal with a newly
organized San Francisco Employers' Council in obtaining a
eollective bargaining agreement. The union refused to bargain except with the individual employers as had been the
custom. To compel joint negotiations, the restaurant owners
made a reduction of 25 per cent in wages, and a six-day week
with split shifts was established instead of the existing five-day
week and straight shift. When the employees were paid at
the lower rate, they left their jobs. . . .
"The commission contended that, in effect, the employers'
action constituted a lockout. This position was upheld because the court determined, after reviewing the employers'
acts, that they were disassociated from any bona fide proposal
in connection with the dispute, hence, •when claimants left
their work, they left because of this economic weapon and not
because of the trade dispute then in existence.' In reaching
its conclusion, the court recognized that, in reality, the form
of the cessation of employment is not controlling and the determinative factor is the volitional cause of the work stoppage.
In other words, although the employees left work of their own
choice, that choice was not freely made but was compelled
by the economic weapon which the employers used. This is
the only sound and fair way to apply the subjective volitional
test stated in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com.,
17 Ca1.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935J.
I I Applying this rule to the issue in the present case, the
stipUlated facts clearly show that the employees of the Sacramento bakeries left their work voluntarily and, therefore,
should have been excluded from receiving unemployment
benefits. Continuously since 1935, the union and the association, by collective bargaining, had entered into one master
contract which included all of the employers and the employees of the baking industry of Sacramento. It seems clear
that under such industry-wide, single contract negotiation,
economic action by either side, whether strike or lockout,
would be considered by each of the parties as action against
the entire group struck or locked out. However, for the purpose of furthering the demand for certain amendments to
that contract, the members of the union, by group action,
voted to strike. The selection of a certain plant or plants
for a shutdown by strike at a particular time was a mere
matter of strategy in the conduct of the trade dispute which
equally involved all of the bakeries and their employees.
This, in effect, applied the union's economic sanctions against
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each employer and brought about the unemployment of all of
its members. Had the association acted first by closing down
one of the member plants and the union followed with a strike
against all of the remaining plants, it would be equally clear
that the volitional act causing unemployment was the initial
shutdown. "
,\Ve recognize also that in McKinley three justices dissented
(pp. 252-263 of 34 Ca1.2d), being of the view that the volitional test was not properly applicable in the circumstances
of that case. We emphasize, however, that the division of
opinion was not on the basic rule of law itself but was solely
as to its applicability as a matter of law to the facts there
presented. The majority determined that "the only sound
and fair way to apply the subjective volitional test stated in
Bodinson" (pp. 243-244) was to enforce it in the circumstances there shown (where there was a trade dispute between
parties to a master collective bargaining contract, each acting
through authorized representatives) against the party who
strikes the first blow with the drastic economic weapon of
strike or lockout. As has hereinabove been shown, the circumstances here, for all purposes material to the rule of
law, are substantially the same or similar to those in McKinley. The equal applicability of the rule therefore, regardless of whether the first blow be struck by employers or
by employes, is now as .much a part of the rule as is the first
enunciation of it in Bodinson or its development and application in Bunny's Waffie Shop.
It is of some significance that the Legislature has not seen
fit to alter section 1262 since decision of the above cited cases
although in various other respects the Unemployment Insurance Code has been amended. (Cole v. Rusk (1955), 45
Ca1.2d 345, 355 [8, 9] [289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137];
State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957),48 Ca1.2d 355, 364 [7]
[310 P.2d 1].) It also bears mention in connection with the
question as to whether we shall depart from or adhere to our
present rule governing construction and application of the
volitional test that the following out of state cases have cited,
followed, and r'elied upon McKinley, Bunny's Waffle Shop.
or Bodinson, or upon the volitional test principles expressed
in those cases: Depaoli v. Ernst (1957), 73 Nev. 79 [309 P.2d
363, 365-367]; Teamsters, Ohauffeurs, etc. Brotherhood v.
Omnge TratTIsp. Co. (1956),5 Utah 2d 45 [296 P.2d 291, 294] ;
Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Indusi1'ial Commission (1952), 121
Utah 525 [243 P.2d 951, 956-959J ; Lexcs v. Industrial Com-
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mission (1952), 121 Utah 551 [243 P.2d 964, 966-969] j
Sckoenwiemer v. Board of Review (1957),44 N.J.Super. 377
[130 A.2d 648) j Climax Fire Brick 00. v. Unemployment
Oomp. Board of Review (1950), 166 Pa.Super. 481 [72 A.2d
300,302] j Amory Worsted Mills v. Riley (1950),96 N.H. 162
[71 A.2d 788, 790-791]); see also AckerZund v. Employment
Security Department (1956),49 Wn.2d 292 [300 P.2d 1019] ;
MO'Untain States Tel. &- Tel. 00. v. Sakrison (1950),71 Ariz.
219 [225 P.2d 707].
As applied in the subject and cited cases the rule works
impartially as to both employes and employers and puts each
group on notice that the one which creates and first applies
the economic weapon in a trade dispute under circumstances
such as those present in Bunny's WafHe Shop, or McKinley
or here, may have to bear responsibility for foreseeable reprisals.
We conclude that in the interest of stability of the law
any change of substance of the rule, or of circumstances for
its applicability, should come from the Legislature rather than
from reconsideration by this court.
The judgment of the superior court is reversed except as
to benefits ordered to be paid to petitioner Joan Northcutt,
who was the employe of San Bemo Restaurant,l which was
.neither an active member of the association nor an authorizing
employer, and as to such benefits it is affirmed.
Spence, J., McComb, J., and White, J., concurred.
Gibson, C. J., concurred in the judgment.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-For the reasons set forth in
the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Gibson in McKinley
v. Oalifornia Emp. Stab. Oom., 34 Ca1.2d 239, 252 [209 P.2d
602], it is my opinion that petitioners did not voluntarily
leave their work because of a trade dispute. (Unempl. Ins.
Code, § 1262.) Since a majority of the court, however, is
unwilling to overrule the McKinley case, I concur in the
judgment under the compulsion of that case.
PETERS, J.-I dissent.
The majority of this court, by judicially amending section
1262 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, l have denied to
·See footnote 2, npra, p. 24.
1FormerlJr section 56 of the Unemployment wlUance Act.
j
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employees who want to work and are desirous of doing so but
who are locked out of their employment by their employers,
the benefits of unemployment insurance conferred upon them
by the statute. This is done by simply holding, contrary to
the fact, and contrary to the realities of the situation, that
employees "voluntarily" leave their work when a strike is
called by the union against several employers, and other employers, not struck, close their plants pursuant to an agreement among the employers that a "strike against one is a
strike against all." Thus, employees who are willing to work
and who are not on strike are prevented from collecting unemployment insurance by a unilateral agreement between
employers to which the employees are not parties. The employers may, of course, legally enter into such an agreement,'
but to hold that, in such event, the employees of the non-struck
plants left their work "voluntarily," and were not the victims
of a "lock out" is to disregard the ordinary, plain and proper
meaning of these two terms. It is judicial legislation of the
most obvious type.
This result is reached on the authority of McKinley v.
California Emp. Stab. Com., 34 Ca1.2d 239 [209 P.2d 602).
It is true that in that case the four justices then constituting
a majority of this court so interpreted the statute. This interpretation was just as wrong then as it is now. This was
clearly pointed out in the dissents of Chief Justice Gibs()n
(34 Ca1.2d at p. 252)2 and of Justice Carter (34 Ca1.2d 263).
We are now told by the majority that, because four members
of this court reached this result in M cKinley, we should not
reappraise that result because to do so will interfere with
the "certainty" of the law. "Certainty" in the law is a
desirable concept, but it is not the only prmciple that should
govern appellate action. I certainly agree that, once this
court has decided an issue, even if it be by a bare majority,
the decision thus reached should be followed in subsequent
cases unless there are compelling reasons why it should not.
It is undeniably true that every decision of the court should
not be reconsidered simply because of a change of personnel
in the court. Stare decisis is an important doctrine. But
it is equally true that it is not the function of a Supreme
Court justice to sit back in every case and automatically perpetuate the errors of his predecessors simply because those
errors were once approved. Where a prior decision is clearly

-xn which disaeut Justice Traynor joiDed.
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wrong, where it has done a great injustice to a large segment
of our population, and where an important issue is at stake a
judge should not hesitate to reevaluate, to reconsider, and, if
necessary, to overrule prior decisions.
This is such a case. This court adopted and properly
applied the so-called volitional test in interpreting section
1256 of the Insurance Code in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California
Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 32~ [109 P.2d 935], and in Bunny',
Waffie Shop v. California Emp. Com., 24 Ca1.2d 735 [151 P.2d
224] . These holdings were misinterpreted and misapplied in
the McKinley case. That misinterpretation and misapplication
of the statute is being perpetuated by the majority opinion
in the present case.
The proper interpretation and application of the statute
were clearly and correctly pointed out by Chief Justice Gibson
and by Justice Carter in their dissents in the McKinley case.
I can add nothing material to what is there said. I base my
dissent on the views there expressed. Suffice it. to say that if
the majority are correct they have placed in the hands of the
employers the means of denying unemployment benefits to a
large segment of labor. If the majority are correct, an overall employers' asociation in any particular area can simply
adopt by unilateral action a policy that a "strike against one
is a strike against all." Then if a strike is called against one,
and there is a general lockout, .all labor thus locked out will
be deprived of the benefits of a statute passed for their benefit.
This is not what the act provides or intends.
I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied December
10, 1959. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

